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1 Introduction
On Humes account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very di¤erent kinds
of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones.
An agents belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this
proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agents
desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth,
motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are
sometimes entangled, they play very di¤erent roles in rational agency.1
In two classic papers (Lewis 1988, 1996), David Lewis discusses several chal-
lenges to this Humean picture, but ultimately rejects them. We think that his
discussion of a central anti-Humean alternative  the desire-as-belief thesis 
is in need of renement. On this thesis, the desire for proposition p is given
by the belief that p is desirable. Lewis claims that [e]xcept in trivial cases,
[this thesis] collapses into contradiction(Lewis 1996, p. 308). The problem, he
argues, is that the thesis is inconsistent with the purportedly plausible require-
ment that ones desire for a proposition should not change upon learning that
the proposition is true; call this the invariance requirement.
In this paper, we revisit Lewiss argument. We show that, if one carefully
distinguishes between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions, the desire-as-
belief thesis can be rendered consistent with the invariance requirement. Lewiss
conclusion holds only under certain conditions: the desire-as-belief thesis con-
icts with the invariance requirement if and only if there are certain correlations
between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions. But when there are such
correlations, we suggest, the invariance requirement loses its plausibility. Thus
Lewiss argument against the desire-as-belief thesis appears to be valid only in
cases in which it is unsound.
1On the standard picture, if a proposition can be expressed as a disjunction of several
other mutually exclusive propositions, the agents desire for it is the sum of the agents desires
for each of the component disjuncts, weighted by his or her beliefs in them. If a proposition
is maximally specic, however  i.e., it is true in one and only one possible world  there is
no entanglement at all: the agents desire for such a proposition is independent of his or her
beliefs.
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2 Lewiss argument restated
Let 
 be the set of all relevant possible worlds; 
 is assumed to be non-empty
and, for simplicity, countable. A proposition is a subset p  
. Thus the set
of all possible propositions is given by the power set P(
). An agents beliefs
are represented by a probability function P : P(
) ! [0; 1] with standard
properties, and his or her desires by a utility function U : P(
)! R. Further,
for any proposition p, let Pp denote the agents revised probability function
obtained by Bayesian updating after learning that p  i.e., Pp() = P (jp) 
and let Up to denote the corresponding utility function.2
To formulate the desire-as-belief thesis, Lewis introduces a halooperator
that assigns to each proposition p the corresponding proposition that p is desir-
able, denoted p. The desire-as-belief thesis states that the desire for p is given
by the belief in p. Formally,
for any p, U(p) = P (p). (1)
Why does Lewis think this thesis collapses into contradiction? Lewis argues
that it conicts with the invariance requirement that the agents desire for p
should be una¤ected by learning that p. Formally,
for any p, Up(p) = U(p). (2)
To see the conict between (1) and (2), notice that (1), understood as a require-
ment both before and after learning that p, and (2) jointly imply that
for any p, Pp(p) = Up(p) = U(p) = P (p),
and thus
for any p, P (pjp) = P (p). (3)
Claim (3) states that p and p are probabilistically independent from each other;
call this the independence requirement. This requirement, however, is not only
violated by many probability functions P , but even when it is satised by P ,
it is usually easy to nd another proposition q  
 such that it is violated
by the agents revised probability function after learning that q. For example,
when P (p) and P (p) are both above 0 but below 1, then q = :(p^p) is such a
proposition: assuming P (pjp) = P (p), we have Pq(pjp) = 0 while Pq(p) > 0,
and hence Pq(pjp) 6= Pq(p).
Thus (1) and (2), both understood as requirements both before and after
Bayesian updating, are mutually inconsistent, except in trivial cases. Given the
invariance requirement, the desire-as-belief thesis therefore leads to a contradic-
tion.
2Suitable provisions are needed if we allow the possibility of conditionalizing on zero-
probability propositions. We set these technicalities aside for the present purposes.
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3 Why Lewiss argument is too quick
It is important to note that, given the desire-as-belief thesis, the invariance
requirement not only implies the independence requirement, but is also implied
by it. The invariance requirement holds if and only if there are no correlations
between proposition p and the proposition that p is desirable. Formally, given
(1), understood as a requirement both before and after updating, (2) and (3) are
equivalent, as Lewis recognizes. But does this observation help us to defend the
desire-as-belief thesis against Lewiss argument? After all, we have seen that (3)
is not only violated by many probability functions, but that Bayesian updating
can also turn a probability function that satises it into one that violates it.
By extending Lewiss analysis in a way that allows us to distinguish between
non-evaluative and evaluative propositions, we now show that there exists a class
of well-dened probability functions and associated utility functions satisfying
the desire-as-belief thesis and the invariance requirement, each understood as
requirements before and after admissible instances of Bayesian updating. We do
not suggest that the distinction between non-evaluative and evaluative proposi-
tions involved in our construction can always be upheld, but its well-denedness
is enough to show that, contrary to Lewiss claim, there do exist non-trivial cases
in which the desire-as-belief thesis is consistent with the invariance requirement.
The key idea underlying our construction is to express the set 
 of all relevant
possible worlds as a Cartesian product of the set  of all possible non-evaluative
states and the set 	 of all possible evaluative states. Formally, 
 = 	. Thus
each possible world ! 2 
 is an ordered pair (; ') of a non-evaluative state
 2  and an evaluative state ' 2 	. Interpretationally,  could capture the
totality of physical facts holding in that world, and ' the totally of normative
facts (e.g., ought facts or goodness facts).
A few words of justication may be useful. On some meta-ethical theories,
the evaluative facts supervene on the non-evaluative ones, meaning that once
 is xed, so is '; and hence the non-evaluative states in  cannot be freely
combined with the evaluative ones in 	. But since we do not generally know
the correct normative theory, we may still consider a whole range of di¤erent
evaluative states epistemically possible, given the same non-evaluative state.
Therefore, when 
 is interpreted as the set of epistemically possible worlds 
which seems appropriate in a theory of rational agency it may well make sense
to express 
 as the Cartesian product of a set of non-evaluative states and a set
of evaluative ones.
As before, a proposition is a subset p  
. We call p purely non-evaluative
if p = p  	 for some p   and purely evaluative if p =   p	 for some
p	  	. A purely non-evaluative proposition has no evaluative implications:
its acceptance in no way narrows down the possible evaluative states; and a
purely evaluative proposition similarly has no non-evaluative implications. An
agents beliefs over the non-evaluative states can be represented by a probability
function P : P() ! [0; 1], his or her beliefs over the evaluative states by a
probability function P	 : P(	)! [0; 1].
We now state a condition on the agents overall probability function
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P : P(
) ! [0; 1] that is su¢ cient for the satisfaction of (a variant of) (1), (2)
and (3) above and guarantees the satisfaction of these requirements even after
admissible instances of Bayesian updating. The condition, called multiplicative
decomposability, requires that the probability of each world is the product of
the probability of its non-evaluative state and the probability of its evaluative
state. Formally,
for any ! 2 
, P (!) = P() P	('), where ! = (; '). (4)
It is easy to see that, under (4), any given pair P and P	 of non-evaluative and
evaluative probability functions induces a unique overall probability function
P : P(
) ! [0; 1]. As an implication, the probability of a conjunction of a
purely non-evaluative proposition and a purely evaluative one is the product of
the probabilities of the two propositions. Formally,
for any p = p 	 and q =  q	 where p   and q	  	,
P (p \ q) = P (p) P (q) = P(p) P	(q	).
In consequence, if p is purely non-evaluative and q purely evaluative,
Pp(q) = P (qjp) = P (p) P (q)
P (p)
= P (q), provided P (p) > 0,
and thus purely evaluative beliefs are invariant under conditionalization on
purely non-evaluative ones (and vice-versa).
To show the satisfaction of (a variant of) (1), (2) and (3), let us dene a
utility function U over all purely non-evaluative propositions as follows: for any
such p, U(p) = P (p). Then (1) is satised, with the quantication restricted
to purely non-evaluative propositions p. Further, because of the multiplicative
decomposability of P , (3) is satised whenever p is purely non-evaluative and
p purely evaluative. By implication, (2) is also satised in such cases.
If the halooperator maps any purely non-evaluative proposition to a purely
evaluative one, all of (1), (2) and (3) are therefore satised with the quanti-
cation restricted to purely non-evaluative propositions p. If the haloopera-
tor maps some purely non-evaluative propositions to propositions that are not
purely evaluative, then (2) and (3) are satised with the quantication restricted
to those purely non-evaluative propositions p for which p is purely evaluative;
such propositions p presumably include maximally specic ones of the form
p = fg  	 where  2 .3 As we have seen, the multiplicative decompos-
ability of P further guarantees that, whenever p is purely evaluative, P (p) is
invariant under Bayesian updating on any purely non-evaluative propositions.
Under our construction, we can therefore conclude that, if we restrict the
quantication as indicated, (1), (2) and (3) are consistent, both before and after
updating on non-evaluative propositions.
3We think the least objectionable version of the desire-as-belief thesis is the one restricted
to maximally specic non-evaluative propositions. On this thesis, we have U(p) = P (p)
for any p = fg  	 with  2 , while U(p) and P (p) may come apart for some other
propositions.
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4 Concluding remarks
Lewiss basic argument is that the desire-as-belief thesis conicts with the in-
variance requirement because their joint satisfaction requires the absence of any
correlations between proposition p and the corresponding proposition that p is
desirable the independence requirement but we cannot rule out such corre-
lations. We have shown that if p is purely non-evaluative and the proposition
that p is desirable purely evaluative, we can rule out such correlations, provided
the relevant probability function is multiplicatively decomposable. Moreover,
in this case, the desire-as-belief thesis and the invariance requirement remain
satised even after Bayesian updating on non-evaluative propositions.
What went wrong with Lewiss argument? Under our construction, which
involves a separation between non-evaluative and evaluative propositions, a mul-
tiplicatively decomposable probability function and quantication over propo-
sitions of the right kind, Lewiss argument is obviously not valid. It is valid
only if violations of the independence requirement are inescapable, at least after
certain instances of Bayesian updating.
But is Lewiss argument also sound in such cases? If the independence
requirement is violated, either before or after a certain instance of Bayesian
updating, it is simply not clear whether we still have any reason to insist on
the invariance requirement. If there is a correlation between p and p, then
it is no surprise that our evaluation of p may change after learning that p.
Similarly, if Bayesian updating leads us to redistribute our beliefs not only over
non-evaluative propositions but also over evaluative ones, then it is no surprise
indeed, it is expected that some of our evaluations may change. The kinds
of propositions that feature in Lewiss examples of Bayesian updating, such as
:(p^ p), have both non-evaluative and evaluative implications, namely for the
conjunction of p and p, and for this reason it is only natural that learning them
a¤ects our assessment of each of the two conjuncts conditional on the other.
Why does Lewis think the invariance requirement is justied? He notes that
it will be violated only if it is violated for at least one world (i.e., a maximally
specic proposition). But this is impossible, he argues, because worlds are
maximally specic with regard to all relevant characteristics, including those
evaluative characteristics determining what is good or desirable: So in assigning
it a value, we do not need to consult our opinions about what is good. We just
follow the built-in hypothesis. (Lewis 1988, p. 332) But Lewiss argument
trades on an ambiguity about the objects of evaluation. It is certainly plausible
that our evaluations of the non-evaluative characteristics of a world should be
xed by a specication of all its relevant evaluative characteristics. However, it
is less obvious that our evaluation of the evaluative characteristics of a world
should be xed by the specication of its non-evaluative ones or even of both
its evaluative and non-evaluative ones. For whenever there is a probabilistic
correlation between what is true and what is desirable, agents may plausibly
prefer those worlds with the evaluative characteristics such as to render desirable
what is likely to be true.
An example may help to clarify this point. Suppose we seek to evaluate
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athletes (or athleticism) on the basis of performance in a decathlon. The rel-
evant non-evaluative facts are those relating to each athletes achievement in
each of the events making up the decathlon: running a certain time in the 100
metres, jumping a certain height in the high-jump and so on. The relevant eval-
uative characteristics are those determining the relation between achievements
in each of the events and how good an athlete someone is. Now it is surely the
case that, given a full specication of the latter, the evaluation of someones
athletic prowess is xed by their performance in each of the decathlon events.
On the other hand, someones evaluation of the relation between performances
and athleticism may well depend on how likely they regard it that they will
achieve certain performances. If we are poor at the 100 metres but good at
the high-jump, for instance, then we will prefer worlds where the mapping from
performance to athleticism favours high-jumpers over sprinters. But, given that
(contrary to expectation) we will do well in the 100 metres, we might prefer the
opposite. So our evaluations of worlds will not be invariant under changes in
our beliefs about our likely achievements.
In short, the conditions under which Lewiss argument is valid are ones in
which the invariance requirement Lewiss key premise in arguing against the
desire-as-belief thesis is implausible. Thus Lewiss argument is valid only in
cases in which it is unsound. To be sure, we agree with Lewis that the following
three claims are mutually inconsistent:
 The desire for proposition p is always given by the belief that p is desirable.
 Ones desire for a proposition never changes upon learning that the propo-
sition is true.
 There are sometimes correlations between proposition p and the propo-
sition that p is desirable, either before or after admissible instances of
Bayesian updating.
But we do not think the inconsistency should worry us; nobody would plausi-
bly assert all three claims at once. Humeans would uphold the second and the
third claims, but drop the rst. Desire-as-belief theorists endorsing our present
construction would uphold the rst and the second claims, but drop the third.
And desire-as-belief theorists who recognize the possibility of correlations be-
tween p and p would keep the rst and the third claims, but bite the bullet by
giving up the second. Of course, the desire-as-belief thesis may give rise to other
problems, but we think the particular collapse into contradiction suggested by
Lewis is not one of them.4
Departments of Philosophy and Government
London School of Economics
London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
4We are grateful to Franz Dietrich and Wlodek Rabinowicz for very helpful comments and
discussions.
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